Lately, there has been a strong push from lawyers, judges, Florida Bar leaders, and the Florida Supreme Court to take a more aggressive stance against professionalism related complaints.
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— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) May 27, 2021
There are a number of things that can get a lawyer in hot water with The Florida Bar’s Lawyer Regulation Department. While any violation of the rules of professional conduct could warrant a disciplinary complaint, some of the more common transgressions investigated by The Florida Bar include:
* Theft of client funds,
* Misrepresentation and other dishonest conduct,
* Failure to comply with trust accounting rules,
* Commission of a crime (in particular a felony),
* Failure to communicate with clients,
* Lack of diligence/competence,
* Conflicts of interest,
* Improper transactions with clients (for example, naming the lawyer as a beneficiary in a client’s will),
* Charging excessive fees,
* Unprofessional conduct with opposing counsel and disrespect to the judiciary.
Lately, there has been a strong push from lawyers, judges, Florida Bar leaders, and the Florida Supreme Court to take a more aggressive stance against professionalism- related complaints.
If trends continue, I would expect to see the prosecution of these types of complaints to increase in the upcoming years.
The process starts when the Bar receives a complaint against a lawyer. Clients, opposing counsel, or judges may file complaints, or the Bar may discover potential misconduct through other means, such as media reports or notice of a bounced check from a lawyer’s bank.
Not all of the thousands of inquiries and complaints the Bar receives each year are prosecuted.
After a complaint is submitted to the Bar, but before charges are filed, intake counsel conducts a preliminary investigation.
If intake counsel determines that the allegations do not warrant discipline, then the case is closed immediately without further action against the attorney.
However, if intake counsel determines that the facts alleged would constitute a violation warranting discipline, then counsel opens a file, notifies the accused attorney, and requests a response within 15 days.
Over the past five years, an average of nearly 7,600 cases each year make it to this stage.
After receiving the lawyer’s response, intake counsel can close the file if the facts do not support going forward.
However, if further investigation is warranted or if the lawyer fails to respond, then intake counsel will forward the case to the Bar’s branch office covering the judicial circuit where the lawyer practices.
The Florida Bar has branch offices in Tallahassee, Tampa, Orlando, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami.
Post Edited: Who is Liar Lawyer Sabrina Rose-Smith of Goodwin Procter, LLP? https://t.co/OwbVqkHOR6
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) June 1, 2021
Once the branch receives the case, it is assigned to Bar counsel who will conduct a factual analysis of the case.
Bar counsel will close the case if disciplinary measures are not warranted.
For relatively minor transgressions, Bar counsel can recommend diversion, in which case the grievance committee can divert the case to a practice and professionalism enhancement program in lieu of disciplinary sanctions.
Diversionary measures can include requiring the respondent to complete ethics school, a trust and accounting workshop, a stress management workshop or an advertising workshop, enter into a contract with Law Office Management Assistance Service (LOMAS) for practice management assistance, or enter into a rehabilitative contract with Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., (FLA, Inc.).
Diversion is not considered “discipline,” which would stay on the attorney’s permanent record.
Finally, if Bar counsel determines that there are sufficient grounds to go forward with prosecution, the complaint is forwarded to a grievance committee in the accused lawyer’s judicial circuit for additional investigation, and The Florida Bar becomes the complainant/prosecutor in the case.
There are 81 local grievance committees across Florida – at least one in each of the state’s 20 judicial circuits. Each circuit’s grievance committees are comprised of lawyers and public members living in that circuit. The grievance committees serve like a grand jury, and are charged with further factual investigation and determining whether there is probable cause that a disciplinary violation occurred.
The grievance committee chair will assign the case to one of the committee members, who will serve as the case’s investigating member. After interviewing witnesses and reviewing evidence, the investigating member will make a recommendation to the grievance committee.
Following a hearing, the grievance committee has a number of options. The grievance committee can:
* Find no probable cause, or no probable cause with a letter of advice, which ends the case with no discipline;
* Recommend mediation or arbitration of a fee dispute;
* Issue a finding of minor misconduct, which includes an admonishment;
* Recommend diversion to a practice and professionalism enhancement program;
* Recommend deferral of grievance committee review until the conclusion of a parallel criminal or civil case against the accused; and
* Find probable cause, which sends the case to trial.
Grievance committee investigations can take from three to six months, and in some cases even longer, depending on the complexity of the case.
Following a probable cause finding by the grievance committee, Bar counsel will draft a formal complaint and file it with the Florida Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court then appoints a circuit or county judge in the respondent’s circuit to serve as the referee for the case.
For cases not disposed of pretrial (such as by motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment), the referee conducts a trial of the case, and hears witnesses and receives other evidence.
The referee then issues a report that contains factual and legal findings, a recommendation of guilt or innocence, and a recommendation of the appropriate sanctions.
The referee’s recommendations are not final until approved by the Supreme Court. Once the report of referee is filed with the Supreme Court, it is reviewed by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Governors and the respondent each have 60 days to appeal a referee’s decision.
The Board of Governors oversees the prosecution and appeals of disciplinary cases at all stages in the process. The Board of Governors can overturn a decision to close a disciplinary file, reviews grievance committee actions, and reviews reports of referees from disciplinary trials and petitions for reinstatement and decides whether to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The initial review occurs with the designated reviewer — the Board of Governors member from the respondent’s circuit assigned to review that specific case through all stages. The designated reviewer can refer matters to the Board of Governors for review. In addition, even if the designated reviewer agrees with an underlying decision, any single Board of Governors member can request review and debate of a disciplinary case by the board.
When review of any disciplinary matter by the Board of Governors is requested, the review first occurs in the Disciplinary Review Committee (DRC) which, with 26 members, is the largest committee of the Board of Governors.
The DRC meets before each of the six Board of Governors meetings each year to review all the disciplinary cases, and to debate those cases referred by designated reviewers or other board members, as well as cases where there is a disagreement between any of the designated reviewer, Bar Counsel and the referee.
The DRC typically reviews between 25 to 40 discipline cases each meeting, and the agenda often contains more than 500 pages of materials for review by the members. The DRC makes recommendations to the Board of Governors, which then votes as a whole on the DRC’s recommendations.
After the grievance committee makes its decision on probable cause, minor misconduct, or referral to diversion, the findings are forwarded to the designated reviewer.
If the designated reviewer disagrees with the grievance committee’s findings, the designated reviewer can send the matter back to the grievance committee for another review, or can request review by the Board of Governors.
The board can overturn a grievance committee’s findings and enter a finding of probable cause, no probable cause or minor misconduct, or the board can order diversion.
After probable cause is found but prior to trial, Bar counsel and the respondent can enter into a proposed consent judgment (like a plea agreement) to resolve the discipline, including disbarments on consent and disciplinary revocations (the voluntary surrender of a license while disciplinary proceedings are pending, which is tantamount to disbarment).
The consent judgment will include a guilty plea, proposed sanctions, and other requirements. Proposed consent judgments are reviewed by the Board of Governors, which can accept or reject a consent judgment, or can condition its acceptance on imposing additional conditions.
Consent judgments approved by the Board of Governors are tendered to the referee, and if approved by the referee, filed with the Supreme Court for consideration.
If a consent judgment is not accepted by both the board and the referee, then the case proceeds to trial.
Referees’ decisions following trial, pretrial dispositive orders (such as dismissal or summary judgment), and recommendations regarding reinstatement of a suspended lawyer are reviewed by the Board of Governors.
If the board disagrees with any aspect of the referee’s decision, including recommendations of guilt or innocence, recommended sanctions, or recommendations regarding reinstatement of a suspended lawyer, then the Board of Governors can seek review by the Supreme Court.
New post: CPFB v Ocwen, Florida: Motion for Reconsideration and Recusal of Judge Kenneth A. Marra https://t.co/upVjSPhKlc
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) June 2, 2021
The Florida Supreme Court is the ultimate and final authority on lawyer discipline matters. The Supreme Court reviews consent judgments and referee decisions from disciplinary trials or reinstatement petitions. If either the Board of Governors or the respondent petition for review of a report of referee, then the matter is briefed. If neither the board nor the respondent petitions for review of the report of referee, then the Supreme Court will conduct its review of the report of referee without briefs unless the court requests briefing.
The Supreme Court can approve or disapprove any aspect of the report of referee, including findings of guilt or innocence or recommendation sanctions. The disciplinary sanctions ordered by the Supreme Court may be harsher or more lenient than the discipline recommended by the referee. The Supreme Court’s decision on guilt or innocence and the ultimate sanction imposed, if any, is final.
The Supreme Court’s orders are enforced through the court’s contempt powers. For example, if a lawyer is accused of practicing law while suspended, the suspended lawyer will be brought before the court on a petition for contempt and new discipline may be imposed. Such discipline is typically increasingly harsh. Thus, a lawyer who is suspended, if found guilty of contempt, may be disbarred. A disbarred lawyer who is caught practicing law may be permanently disbarred and/or face additional contempt sanctions.
Post Edited: So Many Lies Florida Bar, Your Words Legally Void Your Own Existence https://t.co/c6RLxmhPTZ
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) June 1, 2021
While every jurisdiction has its own process and procedures for regulating its attorneys, The Florida Bar’s disciplinary system has many participants and levels of review.
Florida Bar attorneys and professional staff, county and circuit court judges, Supreme Court justices, and a number of volunteers — from the lawyers and public members who serve on the grievance committees to the members of the DRC and the Board of Governors
— spend a substantial amount of time dedicated to ensuring fairness and integrity in the process for the profession, the public, and the respondent.
Special thanks to Ken Marvin, retired director of Lawyer Regulation, and Arne Vanstrum, associate director of Lawyer Regulation, for their contributions to this article.
Brian D. Burgoon has served as an out-of-state member of The Florida Bar Board of Governors since 2000, served as 2013-14 chair of The Florida Bar Disciplinary Review Committee, and served on The Florida Bar Executive Committee. He also served as a member of the statewide Hawkins Commission on Review of the Discipline System.
He practices business litigation, civil litigation, and personal injury with The Burgoon Law Firm in Atlanta. If you have questions about filing a complaint against a lawyer, you may contact the Florida Bar’s Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) hotline at toll free 1-866-352-0707.
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Florida Bar Makes Erie Guesses Instead of Verifying Complaint By Contacting Ocwen’s Lawyers
Law Professor Challenges Eleventh Circuit’s Anomalous Rule as “Sort of Silly”
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The Governor of Florida wants to be the President of the United States and The People’s Liberty and Free Speech Rights are being Quashed. Say No, Citizens.
1. A one-party state where one party has a monopoly on all political activity.
2. A state ideology upheld by the ruling party that is given status as the only authority.
3. State information monopoly that controls mass media for distribution of official truth.
4. State controlled economy with major economic entities under the control of the state.
5. Ideological terror that turns economic or professional actions into crimes. Violators are exposed to prosecution and to ideological persecution.
A content-neutral ban on all residential picketing would be constitutional; but the “intent to harass or disturb” limitation may make the law unconstitutional or ineffective.
The law, signed by Gov. Ron DeSantis yesterday, provides:
(1) As used in this section, the term “dwelling” means a building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families.
(2) It is [a misdemeanor] for a person to picket or protest before or about the dwelling of any person with the intent to harass or disturb that person in his or her dwelling….
(4) Before a person may be arrested for a violation of this section, a law enforcement officer … must go as near to the person as may be done with safety and shall command any person picketing or protesting before or about the dwelling of a person to immediately and peaceably disperse. If any such person does not thereupon immediately and peaceably disperse, he or she may be arrested for a violation of this section.
Gov. DeSantis Brags About Having the Biggest Surplus of Funds… LIF knows How That is Possible. Theft.
Now a flat ban on all “focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence” would be constitutional, as the Court expressly held in Frisby v. Schultz (1988), interpreting an ordinance that used the “before or about” language.
(In Carey v. Brown (1980), the Court had held that a content-based residential picketing ban was unconstitutional, but Frisby held that content-neutral ones are fine.)
But this statute wouldn’t ban all such residential picketing, but only picketing
“with the intent to harass or disturb.”
I appreciate the desire to narrow the ordinance;
consider Justice Stevens’ dissent in Frisby, which faulted the ordinance for making it a crime
“for a fifth grader to carry [a] sign” outside a friend’s home saying, “Get well Charlie—our team needs you.”
But I think this attempt to narrow it might actually make it unconstitutionally content-based, unconstitutionally vague, or perhaps effectively meaningless.
The problem is that the ordinance doesn’t define “harass,” and the closest state law analog—the Florida stalking statute—defines “harass” to “mean[] to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.”
The stalking cases haven’t set forth a categorical test, and indeed acknowledge its uncertainty (and circularity):
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— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) May 13, 2022
Whether the purpose for contact is “legitimate” is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the term “legitimate” seems to be lacking a precise definition.
However, courts have generally held that contact is legitimate when there is a reason for the contact other than to harass the victim.
But they have recognized that a good range of communication, including communication to a person and not just about the person, is viewed as having a “legitimate purpose.”
Indeed, One Florida appellate case made clear that a wife’s “contact[ing her husband’s lover] by phone and by messages and ‘friend’ requests on Facebook” to “tell[ the lover] to stay away from [the husband]” was a legitimate purpose.
Another held the same as to a girlfriend warning her boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend to “stay away” from him.
A third held that calling one’s daughter’s dance team coach to complain about the “daughter’s participation in a dance team competition” “was a legitimate purpose.”
A fourth held the same about “six text messages” “asking him to repay $10,000.”
protesting outside someone’s home to tell the person to vote a particular way on a political proposal
(if the person is a legislator)
or to stop performing abortions
(if the person is an abortion provider)
or to change corporate policy
(if the person is a business executive)
would likewise be a “legitimate purpose” under that term.
(The Florida stalking law also specifically says that another element of the stalking statute, “course of conduct,” “does not include constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized protests,” but that is not itself within the definition of “harass” in that stalking law.)
It thus seems to me that there are three options here:
An intent to communicate to the picketed person that one thinks his behavior is improper (whether having an affair, failing to repay money, acting a particular way as a dance coach, or doing anything else) is a “legitimate purpose,” in which case the “intent to harass” branch of the law would do little about residential picketing.
An intent to communicate to the picketed person that one thinks his behavior is improper is not a “legitimate purpose”; but where is that in the statute, especially given how “legitimate purpose” has been defined in the cases under the Florida stalking statute?
An intent to communicate to the picketed person that one thinks his behavior is improper is sometimes a “legitimate purpose” and sometimes not a legitimate purpose, depending on whether one is communicating about something one has a legitimate interest in (e.g., the target’s having an affair with one’s husband).
But that would likely be unconstitutionally vague, and likely unconstitutionally content-based.
Gov. DeSantis Attended the January Orlando Federalist Society meeting where for the first time, Media was Banned for the speech by a Justice of the US Supreme Court.
Of course, the law also bans residential picketing with the intent to disturb, which might potentially be much broader.
But that term appears to be entirely undefined within Florida law, which further suggests that it might be unconstitutionally vague.
(I did find one other Florida statute that spoke of “harass[ing] or disturb[ing],” but that had to do with manatees.)
Would, say, picketing outside a legislator’s home aiming at persuading the legislator to vote a particular way be viewed as intent to disturb, or as intent to persuade?
What if there’s evidence that the real purpose for the picketing was to draw media attention?
More broadly, the Supreme Court held in Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) that statutory distinctions that “defin[e] regulated speech by its function or purpose” may be content-based, presumably if the function or purpose relates to the content of the speech.
And since speech said with “intent to disturb” would often disturb precisely because of its disturbing content, that would mean the statute is content-based; as I mentioned, the Court has held that content-based restrictions on residential picketing are content-based.
Nor can one respond by saying that all residential picketing is inherently intentionally disturbing because it intentionally intrudes on the target’s privacy:
After all, the law doesn’t ban all residential picketing, but only residential picketing conducted “with the intent to harass or disturb that person in his or her dwelling,” which suggests that the legislature views some residential picketing as intentionally disturbing and some as not.
So it looks like, by trying to limit the scope of the residential picketing ban, the Florida Legislature might have either made it unconstitutional or ineffective.
Perhaps this is a flaw in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence; again, consider Justice Stevens’ view, both in his Frisby dissent and in his Carey dissent, that content discrimination that narrows the scope of such laws is a virtue and not a vice.
Indeed, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Frisby suggested that the better approach is for such laws to be limited “to conduct that unreasonably interferes with the privacy of the home and does not serve a reasonable communicative purpose”—something that might be pretty close to the Florida “intent to harass” language.
But Justice Stevens was dissenting, and for better or worse the majority opinion, with its insistence on content neutrality, is the law.
The Office of Legislative Services Friday ordered powerful gun lobbyist Marion Hammer to refile quarterly lobbying compensation reports for the past four years to reflect income from the National Rifle Association.
Those amended reports have been submitted and Senate President Bill Galvano said he considers the case closed.
Two Democratic lawmakers filed formal complaints in May about Hammer’s quarterly compensation reports.
They charged she failed to fully disclose how much money she was paid to lobby the Legislature on gun issues.
Hammer formed Unified Sportsmen of Florida in 1975 as an NRA affiliate to promote Second Amendment rights at the Capitol. She is its only employee.
OLS General Counsel Audrey H. Moore concluded that Hammer as an “in-house” employee did not have to report lobbying income from Unified Sportsmen but added the money the NRA gives to the group must be disclosed.
Gov. DeSantis openly brags at a TPPF Conference in Texas, funded by Koch Industries, Big Tobacco et al how he manipulated the judges assigned to the courts for his own political agenda.
In a statement, Hammer said it’s never been a secret she was a lobbyist.
She said she sought out and relied on advice from the General Counsel of the Florida Senate that she didn’t need to fulfill any additional filing requirements.
“I, of course, am pleased that this matter has been concluded,”
“However, I am less than happy that the officials handling and commenting on these matters did not highlight the important point that I did not do anything wrong except rely on the advice of counsel.”
Sen. Perry Thurston, D-Fort Lauderdale, and Rep. Anna Eskamani, D-Orlando, filed the formal complaints, they said, to get a better idea of who is driving a gun agenda in the Florida Legislature.
Sen. Perry Thurston, D-Broward County, Vice Chair of the ÊSenate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism and Economic Development speaks at a news conference held in opposition to Senate Bill 7096 in the fourth floor Capitol rotunda Tuesday, April 9, 2019.
Thurston criticized the Rules Committee’s decision to refer the complaint to OLS and not conduct a full investigation.
“Had the Rules Committee followed this mandatory procedure, the people of Florida would have witnessed a much more transparent process, allowing both Republicans and Democrats to probe the facts, bring forward the evidence, and arrive at the appropriate conclusion,” said Thurston.
“The report issued today serves as a bitter reminder of the powerful grip Ms. Hammer and the NRA continue to maintain over the Republican-led Florida legislature,” said Thurston.
Tax filings reveal that Unified Sportsmen raises more than $200,000 annually from its membership but do not show how much money was spent to influence lawmakers.
Eskamani said the House refused to hear nearly a dozen of what she called common-sense gun legislation in 2019 and points to Hammer as the culprit for the silence.
“The public deserves to have an understanding of her level of influence and where her resources come from,”
said Eskamani about the legendary lobbyist credited with creation of the concealed-carry permit and stand-your-ground law.
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The complaint clearly needs to be fleshed out as the basic information provided is insufficient to determine even the basic facts. We’re trackin’ it.
December 18, 2021
Plaintiff ANDY TONG hereby sues Defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and states as follows:
1. Plaintiff, Andy Tong (“Mr. Tong”), is an individual residing in Duval County, Florida.
2. Defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“WFB”) is a Foreign Profit Corporation with a principal address of 420 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California 94163.
3. All actions material to these proceedings occurred within Columbia County, Florida.
4. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391, as all persons, local government authorities and private business entities, involved in this dispute reside or are authorized to do business within the geographic boundaries subject to the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division.
5. This Court has jurisdiction of this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, specifically under 15 U.S.C. §1693m(g) and 28 U.S.C. §1343.
6. At all times in question, Mr. Tong was the owner and holder of Money Market Account Number xxxxxxxxx5467 (the “Account”) with Defendant, WFB.
7. The Account is located in the United States.
8. An ATM/CheckCard Number xxxxxxxxxxxx5467 (“Check Card”) was issued on the Account to Mr. Tong.
9. At all times in question, Mr. Tong was the sole authorized signatory on the Account.
10. At all times in question, Mr. Tong was living in Columbia County, Florida.
11. On or about January 11, 2021 Mr. Tong went to the Wells Fargo branch in Gainesville to withdraw money from his account and noticed unauthorized funds were withdrawn.
12. On or about January 11, 2021, Mr. Tong advised WFB and reported the unauthorized transactions on the Account and requested all records pertaining to the Account.
13. Upon notifying WFB of the unauthorized transactions, WFB representative advised Mr. Tong that the Account was frozen so that no further unauthorized transactions could be made.
14. The Check Card was never out of Mr. Tong’s possession or control.
15. Prior to January 11, 2021, Mr. Tong never learned of or had reason to suspect of any counterfeit card or of any loss or theft of Account information used to make the unauthorized transfers.
16. With the exception of the occasional gas purchase, all of the transactions identified on the attached Exhibit “A” were unauthorized (the “Unauthorized Transactions.”)
17. As a result of the Unauthorized Transactions, the Account and Mr. Tong have lost approximately $454,636.17.
18. WFB is considered a “financial institution” per 15 U.S.C. §1693a(9).
19. “Electronic funds transfer” is defined as “any transfer of funds . . . which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term includes . . . direct deposits or withdrawals of funds ” 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7); see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
20. The rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of the parties to this action, with respect to the unauthorized transactions on the Account, are governed by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq.) (the “EFTA”).
21. The purpose of the EFTA is “to provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems. The primary objective of this subchapter, however, is the provision of individual consumer rights.” (15 U.S.C. § 1693, ¶ (b) of the introduction).
22. According to § 1693m(a) of the EFTA, “ any person who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any consumer, except for an error resolved in accordance with section 1693f of this title, is liable to such consumer in an amount equal to the sum of (1) any actual damage sustained by such consumer as a result of such failure; (2)(A) in the case of an individual action, an amount not less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and (3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”
23. In order to be liable to Mr. Tong under § 1693m(a) of the EFTA, WFB must have failed to resolve an error in accordance with § 1693f of the EFTA.
24. For purposes of § 1693f of the EFTA, the unauthorized transactions reported by Mr. Tong constitute errors. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(f)(1).
25. Pursuant to § 1693f of the EFTA, WFB was required to investigate the unauthorized transactions reported by Mr. Tong, determine whether an error had occurred, and report or mail the results of such investigation and determination to Mr. Tong and/or the other account holders within ten (10) business days after WFB received notice of the Unauthorized Transactions (i.e., within 10 business days after January 11, 2021 or, in lieu of such requirement, WFB could have, within ten (10) business days after receiving such notice, provisionally re-credited the Account for the amount of the unauthorized transactions, subject to 15 U.S.C. § 1693g, including any applicable interest, pending the timely conclusion of WFB’s investigation and determination of whether an error had occurred on the WFB Account. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a) and (c).
26. However, during the requisite ten (10) business-day period, WFB did not report or mail the results of WFB’s investigation and determination of Mr. Tong’s claim, nor did WFB provisionally re-credited the Account for any amount of the unauthorized transactions pending the conclusion of WFB’s investigation and its determination of whether an error had occurred on WFB Account.
27. Moreover, WFB was obligated to re-credit the Account for the amount of the Unauthorized Transactions, as the Check Card used to make the Unauthorized Transactions on the Account was not an accepted card or other means of access as defined in § 1693a of the EFTA. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g.
28. Even if the Check Card used to make the Unauthorized Transactions on the Account had been an accepted card or other means of access, as defined in § 1693a of the EFTA, WFB would have been required to reimburse their respective portions of the Account for the amount of the Unauthorized Transactions, less a maximum of fifty dollars ($50.00). See, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g.
29. WFB never re-credited the Account for any amount.
